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Abstract. From transportation networks to complex infrastructures, and to social and eco-
nomic networks, a large variety of systems can be described in terms of multiplex networks
formed by a set of nodes interacting through different network layers. Network robustness,
as one of the most successful application areas of complex networks, has also attracted great
interest in both theoretical and empirical researches. However, the vast majority of existing
researches mainly focus on the robustness of single-layer networks an interdependent networks,
how multiplex networks respond to potential attack is still short of further exploration. Here we
study the robustness of multiplex networks under two attack strategies: layer node-based ran-
dom attack and layer node-based targeted attack. A theoretical analysis framework is proposed
to calculate the critical threshold and the size of giant component of multiplex networks when
a fraction of layer nodes are removed randomly or intentionally. Via numerous simulations,
it is unveiled that the theoretical method can accurately predict the threshold and the size of
giant component, irrespective of attack strategies. Moreover, we also compare the robustness
of multiplex networks under multiplex node-based attack and layer node-based attack, and find
that layer node-based attack makes multiplex networks more vulnerable, regardless of average
degree and underlying topology. Our finding may shed new light on the protection of multiplex
networks.
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§1 Introduction
Robustness of networks refers to the ability of preserving their functional integration when they
are subject to failures or attacks [1,2]. Understanding the robustness of networks is thus useful
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2for evaluating the resilience of systems and constructing more efficient architectures. During
the past decades, there have been a great number of works contributing to this topic. But
the majority of these achievements mainly focus on the vulnerability of single-layer networks
[3–7], which seems inconsistent with the well-recognized fact that nodes can simultaneously
be the elements of more than one network in most, yet not all, natural and social systems
[8–10]. Recently, Buldyrev et al. studied the robustness of interdependent networks, where
two networks were coupled in one-to-one interdependence way [11]. Following the failure of
one node, a cascading crash took place in both networks (namely, interdependent networks are
intrinsically more fragile than traditional single-layer networks), which was accurately validated
by the theoretical analysis as well. After this interesting finding, the research of network science
is fast extended to multilayer framework [12–16], where systems are usually composed of several
network layers, including interdependent networks [17–24], interconnected networks [25–30] and
multiplex networks [31, 33–44]. Thus far, the topological characteristics of multilayer networks
and dynamical process (such as evolutionary game theory [20,22], disease spreading [28,29,37,43],
random diffusion [31] and synchronization [39]) upon them have attracted great attention in both
theoretical and empirical areas (for a recent review see [12]).
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Figure 1: (a) six nodes are connected via two kinds of links, blue link and black link. (b) Such
systems can be embedded into the framework of multiplex networks with two types of links.
Each link type defines a network layer, and the nodes of each network layer are same. The
connectivity inter-layer (dash line) is from each node to itself.
Different from interdependent netowrks, multiplex networks, as a typical kind of topology
structures, can be regarded as the combination of several network layers which contain the same
nodes yet different intra-layer connections. In this sense, many real-world systems like online
social networks [45], technological networks [46], transportation networks [47] can be further
studied with the viewpoint of multiplex networks. Fig.1 gives an illustration of multiplex frame-
work: six people are connected via two kinds of relationship, for example Facebook friends (blue
links) and Twitter friends (black links) (panel (a)). Such systems can be well embedded into the
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framework of multiplex networks with two types of links. Each link type in the system defines
a network layer, and the nodes of each network layer are same (see panel (b), the connectivity
inter-layer is from each node to itself). To distinguish the node of multiplex networks (nodes in
panel (a)) and its agent in each network layer, here we define them the terminology respectively:
multiplex node and layer node.
Looking back to the early topic, the research of robustness of multiplex networks thus be-
comes a very interesting and crucial challenge. In [44], Min et al. explored the robustness of
multiplex networks when multiplex nodes were removed randomly or intentionally (here the
removal of a multiplex node means all its agents in each network layers are removed). They
showed that correlated coupling would affect the structural robustness of multiplex networks
in diverse fashion. In some realistic cases, however, the failure unites or attack targets may be
just the layer nodes. For example, the users of social networks are banned to use one or some
but not all of the social network sites. Similarly, for multiplex transport networks where nodes
are cities and network layers are airplane network, highway network and railway network, the
failures may take place in one or some but not all layers. Therefore, an interesting question
naturally poses itself, which we aim to address in this letter. Namely, how does the removal of
layer node affect the robustness of multiplex networks?
Aiming to answer this issue, we consider the robustness of multiplex networks under layer
node-based attack, which can be further divided into random and targeted scenarios. With the
framework of generating function method [48], we propose theoretical method to calculate the
critical threshold of network crash and the size of giant component when a fraction of layer
nodes are removed. Furthermore, we also compare the robustness of multiplex networks under
multiplex nodes-based attack and layer node-based attack.
§2 Model and analysis
As mentioned in previous literatures [11,19,21], the robustness of networks is usually evaluated
by one critical threshold value and the size of giant component after the removal of nodes.
If the fraction of removed nodes exceeds this critical threshold, the giant component becomes
null. Here it is worth mentioning that the component of multiplex network is defined as a
set of connected multiplex nodes. A pair of multiplex nodes is regarded to have connection if
there exists at least one type of link between them. Therefore, attacking some layer nodes may
not destroy their connection with other nodes (see Fig.2). In the following, we will focus on
theoretical method of calculating the critical threshold value and the size of giant component of
the multiplex networks under layer node-based attack.
For a multiplex network composing of N multiplex nodes and m network layers, the gener-
ating function for the joint degree distribution p(
−→
kj ), where
−→
kj = (kj1, kj2, ..., kjm) denotes the
degrees of a multiplex node j in each layer, can be written in the form of a finite polynomial
G0(
−→x ) =
∑
−→
kj
p(
−→
kj )
m∏
i=1
x
kji
i , (1)
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Figure 2: Layer node-based attack: (a) layer node 1 of Layer-1 and layer node 4 of Layer-2
are initially attacked, (b) soon layer nodes 1,2 of Layer-1 and 3,4 and 5 of Layer-2 become
failure nodes since they do not belong to the giant component of corresponding layers. (c) But
multiplex nodes 1-6 still belong to the giant component of the multiplex networks since they
connect to the giant component through at least one type of links.
where −→x = (x1, x2, ..., xm) represents the auxiliary variable coupled to
−→
kj . Then the generating
function of remaining joint degree distribution by following a randomly chosen link of network
layer i is given by
G
(i)
1 (
−→x ) =
1
zi
∂
∂xi
G0(
−→x ), (2)
where zi is the average degree of layer i.
If ui (i = 1, 2, ...,m) is defined as the probability that a multiplex node reached by following
a random chosen link of network layer i does not belong to the giant component, it can be
derived by the coupled self-consistency equation
ui = G
(i)
1 (
−→u ), (3)
where −→u = (u1, u2, ..., um). Furthermore, the size of the giant component can be calculated
according to
R = 1−G0(
−→u ). (4)
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Along this framework, we can now turn to the layer node-based attack on multiplex networks.
If φi(kj i) is used to denote the probability that a layer node with degree kji is removed from
network layer i, then the generating function of the joint degree distribution after the removal
of layer nodes can be expressed as
H0(
−→x ) =
∑
−→
kj
p(
−→
kj )
m∏
i=1
(φi(kji) + (1− φi(kji))x
kj i
i ). (5)
Correspondingly, the generating function of remaining joint degree distribution after the removal
of layer nodes by following a randomly chosen link of network layer i is given by
H
(i)
1 (
−→x ) =
1
zi
∂
∂xi
H0(
−→x ). (6)
In the case of layer node removal, the probability vi that a multiplex node reached by
following one random chosen link of network layer i does not belong to the giant component can
be written as
vi =
1
zi
∑
−→
kj
kjip(
−→
kj )(φi(kj i)+
(1− φi(kj i))v
kj i−1
i
∏
s6=i
(φs(kjs) + (1− φs(kjs))v
kjs
s ))
=
〈kj iφi(kj i)〉
zi
+H
(i)
1 (
−→v ).
(7)
Then, after the removal of nodes from layers, the size of giant component is given as follows
R = 1−H0(
−→v ). (8)
The existence of giant component under layer node-based attack requires the largest eigen-
value Λ of the Jacobian matrix J of Eq. (7) at (1,1,...,1) to be larger than unity [44]. In this
work, we mainly focus on multiplex networks composed of two Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random [49]
or Baraba´si-Albert scale-free (SF) [50] network layers (namely, m = 2), J thus can be written
as
J =
(
κ1 K1
K2 κ2
)
, (9)
where κi = (〈kj
2
i
(1 − φi(kj i))〉 − 〈kj i(1 − φi(kji))〉)/zi and Ki = 〈kj1kj2(1 − φ1(kj1))(1 −
φ2(kj2))〉/zi. The largest eigenvalue Λ is given by
Λ =
1
2
[κ1 + κ2 +
√
(κ1 − κ2)2 + 4K1K2]. (10)
§3 Results
3.1 Layer node-based random attack
For layer node-based random attack, which is characterized by random removal of layer nodes
from network layers, there exists the removal probability φi(kji) = φ
LR
i (i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, ...N).
According to the above analysis, the critical threshold and the size of giant component of
6multiplex networks under layer node-based random removal can be respectively expressed as
(φLR1 , φ
LR
2 )c = {(φ
LR
1 , φ
LR
2 )|Λ = 1} (11)
and
RLR = 1−H0(
−→v ), (12)
where φi(kj i) = φ
LR
i .
It is worth mentioning that above (φLR1 , φ
LR
2 )c there is no giant component, whereas below
(φLR1 , φ
LR
2 )c a giant connected cluster exists.
Figure 3: (Color online) The size RLR of giant component in dependence on removal probability
φLR1 and φ
LR
2 for layer node-based random attack. The black line indicates the theoretical
critical threshold calculated according to Eq.(11). The networks used are multiplex ER network
with average degree (a) z1 = z2 = 1, (b) z1 = 2, z2 = 3 and size N = 5000.
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Figure 4: (Color online) Theoretical (line) and numerical (point) results of the size RLR of giant
component as a function of φLR2 when φ
LR
1 takes fixed values. The networks used are multiplex
ER networks with average degree (a) z1 = z2 = 1, (b) z1 = 2, z2 = 3 and size N = 5000.
We start by inspecting how layer node-based random attack affects the robustness of mul-
tiplex networks. Fig.3 shows the size RLR of giant component in dependence on the removal
probability φLR1 and φ
LR
2 for network layer 1 and network layer 2, respectively. Moreover, the
black line indicates the theoretical critical threshold calculated according to Eq.(11). It is clear
that when the removal probability (φLR1 , φ
LR
2 ) is above this black line, the size of giant com-
ponent becomes negligible; whereas there exists one giant component if (φLR1 , φ
LR
2 ) is located
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below this black line. This implies that the theoretical critical threshold can accurately predict
the impact of layer node-based attack on robustness of multiplex networks. To further validate
this fact, we also compare the theoretical prediction derived from Eq.(12) and simulation results
for the size of giant component in Fig.4. It can be observed that there is indeed good agreement
between simulation and theoretical prediction.
3.2 Layer node-based targeted attack
Targeted attack, as a well-known attack strategy, usually aims to remove influential nodes, which
can be identified by centrality measures, such as the degree centrality, eigenvector centrality,
k-shell centrality and betweenness centrality [51]. In this work, we mainly pay attention to the
viewpoint of degree centrality. For layer node-based targeted attack, the removal probability of
a layer node with degree kji is determined by its degree, and can be expressed as follows
φi(kj i) =


1, if kji > kci
fi, if kji = kci
0, if kji < kci
, (13)
where kci is the cutoff degree for attack on network layer i, and fi denotes the removal probability
of node with degree kci. Consequently, the total fraction of removal nodes in network layer i is
given by
φLTi =
∑
kj i
pi(kji)φi(kj i), (14)
where pi(kji) indicates the fraction of layer nodes with degree kji in layer i.
Similar to Eqs. (11) and (12), we can get the critical threshold
(φLT1 , φ
LT
2 )c = {(φ
LT
1 , φ
LT
2 )|Λ = 1}, (15)
and the size of giant component
RLT = 1−H0(
−→v ), (16)
where φi(kj i) is defined as Eq. (13), for layer node-based targeted attack on multiplex networks
consisting of two network layers.
In Fig.5, the color code represents the size RLT of the giant component as a function of the
removal probability φLT1 and φ
LT
2 under layer node-based targeted attack, and the black line
indicates the theoretical critical threshold calculated according to Eq.(15). Similar to Fig.3,
the theoretical prediction fully agrees with the simulation results. Moreover, Fig.6 provides
the further comparison between the theoretical prediction and simulation for the size of giant
components, which also validates the accuracy of theoretical method. Combining with all the
above phenomena, it is clear that the proposed theoretical framework can allow us to accurately
calculate the critical threshold and the size of giant component under the layer node-based
attack.
8Figure 5: (Color online) The size RLT of giant component in dependence on removal probability
φLT1 and φ
LT
2 for layer node-based targeted attack. The black line indicates the theoretical
critical threshold calculated according to Eq.(15). The networks used are multiplex ER networks
with average degree (a) z1 = z2 = 2, (b) z1 = 2, z2 = 4 and size N = 5000.
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Figure 6: (Color online) Theoretical (line) and numerical (point) results of the size RLT of giant
component as a function of φLT2 when φ
LT
1 takes fixed values. The networks used are multiplex
ER networks with average degree (a) z1 = z2 = 2, (b) z1 = 2, z2 = 4 and size N = 5000.
3.3 Comparison of robustness of multiplex networks
Based on the above analysis, multiplex node-based attack proposed in [44], can be regarded
as a special case of layer node-based attack when all the removed nodes or replicas are the
same in each network layer. From the economic viewpoint, the cost of removing p fraction of
multiplex nodes seems approximately equal to that of removing p fraction of layer nodes in each
network layer. However, the damage of both scenarios on the multiplex networks may be greatly
different. In this sense, it becomes very instructive to compare the robustness of multiplex
networks under multiplex node-based attack and layer node-based attack. For simplicity of
comparison, we assume that layer node-based attack means to remove the same proportion of
layer nodes in each network layer in what follows. The removal probability correspondingly
becomes φLR1 = φ
LR
2 = φ
LR for layer node-based random attack and φLT1 = φ
LT
2 = φ
LT for
layer node-based targeted attack. While for multiplex node-based attack, the total fraction of
removal multiplex nodes under random attack and targeted attacks becomes φMR (all of the
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multiplex nodes are removed randomly with probability φMR) and
φMT =
∑
−→
kj
p(
−→
kj )φ
MT (
−→
kj ), (17)
where p(
−→
kj ) indicates the fraction of multiplex nodes with degree
−→
kj = {kj1 , kj2}, and φ
MT (
−→
kj )
is defined as the removal probability of multiplex nodes with degree
−→
kj and given by
φMT (
−→
kj ) =


1, if kj1 + kj2 > kc
f, if kj1 + kj2 = kc
0, if kj1 + kj2 < kc
, (18)
where kc is the cutoff degree and f denotes the removal probability of node which satisfies
kj1 + kj2 = kc.
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Figure 7: (Color online) The critical threshold of multiplex networks in dependence on the
network average degree under multiplex node-based random attack (red dash line) and layer
node-based random attack (black solid line). The networks used are (a) multiplex ER networks
with average degree z1 = z2 = z and (b) multiplex SF networks with average degree z1 = z2 = z.
The size of all the networks is N = 5000.
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Figure 8: (Color online) The critical threshold of multiplex networks in dependence on the
network average degree under multiplex node-based targeted attack (red line) and layer node-
based targeted attack (black line). The networks used are (a) multiplex ER networks with
average degree z1 = z2 = z and (b) multiplex SF networks with average degree z1 = z2 = z.
The size of all the networks is N = 5000.
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Similar to the above treatment, we still use the critical threshold as a uniform evaluation
index for multiplex node-based attack and layer node-based attack. In fact, the larger the
value of critical threshold, the better the robustness of multiplex networks against attack. Fig.7
features how the the critical threshold of multiplex networks varies as a function of average
degree under both multiplex node-based random attack (red line) and layer node-based random
attack (black line). It is clear that the threshold of both cases rises with the increment of
average degree, which means that multiplex networks are more robust for denser connections.
Interestingly, another observation of utmost significance is that the threshold of multiplex node-
based random attack is always higher than that of layer node-based random attack, irrespective
of the average degree and underlying connection topology. This is to say, multiplex networks are
more vulnerable under layer node-based attack, because it usually makes more multiplex nodes
subject to attack and lose more connections with other multiplex nodes. Moreover, we can also
obtain the similar observation for multiplex node-based targeted attack and layer node-based
targeted attack in Fig.8, which further supports the fact that layer node-based attack brings
larger damage to multiplex networks. Along this seminal finding, it may shed new light into the
research of protection or immunization of empirical multiplex topology.
§4 Summary
To sum, we have studied the robustness of multiplex networks under layer node-based attack.
Under this framework, the layer nodes can be removed randomly or intentionally, which corre-
sponds to layer node-based random attack or layer node-based targeted attack. A theoretical
method is proposed to evaluate the robustness of multiplex networks when a fraction of layer
nodes are removed. Through numerous simulations, this method can accurately calculate the
threshold and size of giant component, irrespective of the removal case. In addition, we also
compare the robustness of multiplex networks under multiplex node-based attack and layer
node-based attack. An interesting finding is that multiplex networks will be more robust un-
der multiplex node-based attack, which is universal for different average degree and underlying
topology. With regard to the reason, it may be related with the fact that layer node-based
attack usually brings damage to more multiplex nodes, which will directly break the remaining
joint component of networks.
Since multiplex framework is ubiquitous in realistic social and technological networks, we
hope that the present outcomes can inspire further research of the robustness of multiplex net-
works, especially combining with the novel properties of multiplex networks, like the clustering
characteristic [23], degree-degree correlation between network layers [37]. In addition, the tar-
geted attack can also be incorporated into other centrality measures, such as the eigenvector
centrality, k-shell centrality and betweenness centrality [51]. Along this line, we may get new
understanding for the protection of multiplex network.
Dawei Zhao, et al. 11
§5 Acknowledgement
This paper was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.
61572297), Shandong Province Outstanding Young Scientists Research Award Fund Project
(Grant No. BS2015DX006, BS2014DX007) and Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province
(Grant No. ZR2014FM003, ZR2015YL018).
References
[1] Cohen, R., Havlin, S., Complex Networks: Structure, Robustness and Function, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
[2] Callaway, D. S., Newman, M. E., Strogatz, S. H., Watts, D. J., Physical review letters, 85
(2000) 5468.
[3] Albert, R., Jeong, H.,Baraba´si, A. L., Nature, 406 (2000) 378-382.
[4] Motter, A. E.,Lai, Y. C., Physical Review E, 66 (2002) 065102.
[5] Perc, M., New Journal of Physics, 11 (2009) 033027.
[6] Shargel, B., Sayama, H., Epstein, I. R.,Bar-Yam, Y., Physical review letters, 90 (2003)
068701.
[7] Xiao, S., Xiao, G., Cheng, T. H., Ma, S., Fu, X.,Soh, H., EPL (Europhysics Letters), 89
(2010) 38002.
[8] Kivela¨, M., Arenas, A., Barthelemy, M., Gleeson, J. P., Moreno, Y., Porter, M. A., Journal
of Complex Networks, 2 (2014) 203.
[9] Cardillo, A., Zanin, M., Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Romance, M., del Amo, A.J.G., Boccaletti,
S., The European Physical Journal Special Topics, 23 (2013) 215.
[10] Wang, Z., Wang, L., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., The European Physical Journal B, 88 (2015)
214.
[11] Buldyrev, S. V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H. E., Havlin, S., Nature, 464 (2010)
1025-1028.
[12] Boccaletti, S., Bianconi, G., Criado, R., Del Genio, C. I., Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Romance,
M., Sendin˜a-Nadalj, I., Wang, Z.,Zanin, M., Physics Reports, 544 (2014) 1-122.
[13] De Domenico, M., Sole´-Ribalta, A., Cozzo, E., Kivela, M., Moreno, Y., Porter, M. A.,
Go´mez, S., Arenas, A., Physical Review X, 3 (2013) 041022.
[14] Kivela, M., Arenas, A., Barthelemy, M., Gleeson, J. P., Moreno, Y., Porter, M. A., arXiv
preprint, (2013) arXiv:1309.7233.
12
[15] Salehi, M., Sharma, R., Marzolla, M., Montesi, D., Siyari, P., Magnani, M., arXiv preprint,
(2014) arXiv:1405.4329.
[16] Zhao, D., Wang, L., Xu, L., Wang, Z., Applied Mathematics and Computation, 266 (2015)
599-604.
[17] Gao, J., Buldyrev, S. V., Stanley, H. E., Havlin, S., Nature physics, 8 (2012) 40-48.
[18] Dong, G., Gao, J., Du, R., Tian, L., Stanley, H. E., Havlin, S., Physical Review E, 87
(2013) 052804.
[19] Gao, J., Buldyrev, S. V., Havlin, S., Stanley, H. E., Physical Review Letters, 107 (2011)
195701.
[20] Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., Scientific reports, 3 (2013) 1183.
[21] Parshani, R., Buldyrev, S. V., Havlin S., Physical review letters, 105 (2010) 048701.
[22] Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., Scientific reports, 3 (2013) 2470.
[23] Parshani, R., Rozenblat, C., Ietri, D., Ducruet, C., Havlin, S., EPL (Europhysics Letters),
92 (2010) 68002.
[24] Shao, J., Buldyrev, S. V., Havlin, S., Stanley, H. E., Physical Review E, 83 (2011) 036116.
[25] Radicchi, F., Arenas, A., Nature Physics, 9 (2013) 717C720.
[26] De Domenico, M., Sole´-Ribalta, A., Go´mez, S., Arenas, A., Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 111 (2014) 8351-8356.
[27] Wang, H., Li, Q., DAgostino, G., Havlin, S., Stanley, H. E., Van Mieghem, P., Physical
Review E, 88 (2013) 022801.
[28] Saumell-Mendiola, A., Serrano, M. A´., Bogun˜a´, M., Physical Review E, 86 (2012) 026106.
[29] Dickison, M., Havlin, S., Stanley, H. E., Physical Review E, 85 (2012) 066109.
[30] Zhao, D., Li, L., Li, S., Huo, Y., Yang, Y., Physica Scripta, 89 (2014) 015203.
[31] Serrano A. M., Buzna, L., Boguna, M., arXiv preprint, (2015) arXiv:1502.04553
[32] Zhao, D., Wang, L., Xu, L., Wang, Z., Applied Mathematics and Computation, 266 (2015)
599-604.
[33] Bastas, N., Lazaridis, F., Argyrakis, P., Maragakis, M., EPL (Europhysics Letters), 109
(2015) 38006.
[34] Sole-Ribalta, A., De Domenico, M., Kouvaris, N. E., Diaz-Guilera, A., Gomez, S.,Arenas,
A., Physical Review E, 88 (2013) 032807.
Dawei Zhao, et al. 13
[35] Serrano, M. A´., Buzna, L., Bogun˜a´, M., New Journal of Physics, 17 (2015) 053033.
[36] Granell, C., Go´mez, S., Arenas, A., Physical review letters, 111 (2013) 128701.
[37] Zhao, D., Li, L., Peng, H., Luo, Q., Yang, Y., Physics Letters A, 378 (2014) 770-776.
[38] Zhao, D., Wang, L., Li, S., Wang, Z., Wang, L.,Gao, B., PloS one, 9 (2014) e112018.
[39] Gambuzza, L. V., Frasca, M.,Gomez-Garden˜es, J., arXiv preprint, (2014) arXiv:1407.3283.
[40] Battiston, F., Nicosia, V., Latora, V., Physical Review E, 89 (2014) 032804.
[41] Kim, J. Y., Goh, K. I., Physical review letters, 111 (2013) 058702.
[42] Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Reinares, I., Arenas, A., Flor´Ia, L. M., Scientific reports, 2 (2012)
620.
[43] Buono, C., Alvarez-Zuzek, L. G., Macri, P. A., Braunstein, L. A., Plos one, 9 (2014) e92200.
[44] Min, B., Do Yi, S., Lee, K. M., Goh, K. I., Physical Review E, 89 (2014) 042811.
[45] Dodds, P. S., Muhamad, R.,Watts, D. J., science, 301 (2003) 827-829.
[46] Wang, W. X., Wang, B. H., Hu, B., Yan, G.,Ou, Q., Physical review letters, 94 (2005)
188702.
[47] Banavar, J. R., Maritan, A.,Rinaldo, A., Nature, 399 (1999) 130-132.
[48] Watts, J., Phys. Rev. E., 64 (2001) 026118.
[49] Erdo¨s, R., Publ. Math. Debrecen, 6 (1959) 290.
[50] Baraba´si, A. L., Albert, R., Science, 286 (1999) 509-512.
[51] Ren, X. L., Lu¨, L. Y., Chin Sci Bull (Chin Ver), 59 (2014) 1175-1197.
